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“We Know It When We See It”: 
Intermediary Trademark Liability and the Internet 
STACEY L. DOGAN ∗ 
CITE AS: 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/dogan-intermediary-trademark-liability.pdf 
¶1 The recent history of intermediary liability decisions in copyright and trademark law reflects a 
notable resistance to rules that might constrain judicial discretion to ferret out bad guys. The 
Supreme Court in Grokster suggested such resistance, by limiting the Sony safe harbor to defendants 
with squeaky-clean intentions.1 In the trademark context, recent decisions have shown great 
solicitude toward good-faith actors, while reserving the option to condemn those who act with the 
apparent design to sow confusion. Indeed, a dichotomy appears to be emerging between two types 
of defendants: those who want infringement to happen and those who do not. The former group 
faces almost certain liability, while the latter receives broad immunity, even when its services facilitate 
widespread infringement. The Sony safe harbor and its trademark analog, in other words, are available 
only to intermediaries that appear to be acting in good faith and with ultimately non-infringing 
objectives.  
¶2 So far, so good, perhaps—after all, who wants to discourage courts from ferreting out bad guys? 
And it may be that the courts are muddling their way toward the right outcomes. The problem is that 
much of what seems to implicitly motivate courts’ decisions fails to find its way into the doctrine, 
leaving less-than-satisfying guidance to future courts and parties. Intermediary liability analysis often 
looks like the Supreme Court’s approach to obscenity: we know it when we see it.2 On the one hand, 
the Supreme Court has crafted a new doctrine of inducement that turns more on evidence of parties’ 
motivations and technological design choices than on their active encouragement of infringement by 
third parties.3 At the other extreme, courts like the Second Circuit in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc. state 
a broad rule of immunity for parties that lack actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement, 
while spending a curious amount of time belaboring purportedly irrelevant matters like the extra 
efforts the defendant took to affirmatively root out the wrongdoing in that case.4 
                                                
*  2011, Stacey L. Dogan, Professor & Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. 
1 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005); see generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the produce is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.  
Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing use.”). 
2 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly” defining 
constitutionally unprotected hardcore pornography, but “I know it when I see it”). 
3 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939, n.12 (2005); see also id. at 958 (Breyer, J., concurring) (identifying the refusal to inquire into 
technology design as one of the chief virtues of the Sony safe harbor). 
4 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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¶3 In the end, what matters most in these cases is whether the court believes in the defendant’s 
essential legitimacy and good faith.  In both copyright and trademark cases, courts are developing 
two distinct sets of rules to deal with two different classes of intermediaries. Good-faith 
intermediaries—those with a core business model unrelated to infringement—have an obligation to 
address infringement upon notice, but need not go out of their way to root it out; a reactive approach 
will suffice to protect them from liability. Bad-faith intermediaries, on the other hand—those who 
not only benefit from infringement, but intend it to happen—face certain liability, without regard to 
specific notice of particular acts of infringement. 
¶4 The trick, of course, lies in understanding how to differentiate between good and bad faith 
actors. Doctrinally, copyright courts are turning to inducement to do the sorting. Inducers, as bad 
actors, get none of the protections afforded to other infringement-enabling intermediaries. So what 
makes someone an inducer? We don’t yet have much case law in trademark law, but copyright gives 
us some clues. Despite its name, copyright inducement has little to do with exhorting infringement, 
and everything to do with economic incentive and system design. Inducers are those whose business 
model depends, at its core, on infringement. Indeed, I believe that this factor largely explain the 
outcome in suits against intermediaries. And far from defying Sony, I view this development as fully 
consistent with the normative goal laid out by the Supreme Court in defending the staple article of 
commerce doctrine: “[t]he staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a 
copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of 
commerce.”5 I will come back to explain why I think this language lies at the heart of today’s 
intermediary liability rules; but first let me step back and sketch out some of my more preliminary 
claims. 
I. It’s All About Finding the Bad Guys  
¶5 My first claim is that the case law over the past several years reveals a strong suspicion of rules 
that might insulate from liability parties that have the purpose and motive to facilitate infringement. 
Courts seem to want a broad safe space for good actors, but no protection for the bad guys, 
regardless of whether their services or technology might have beneficial collateral effects. And the 
task of defining “bad guys” lies in the broad discretion of the court, with subjective intent and 
commercial motives front and center in exercising that discretion. 
A. Copyright 
¶6 In copyright, we see this phenomenon most notably in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Grokster.6 
As that case made its way through the lower courts, most observers thought the outcome would turn 
on the extent to which the defendants’ file-sharing services enabled “substantial non-infringing 
use”—an apparently objective inquiry suggested by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sony. The 
Supreme Court, though, wanted nothing of it. Without disturbing Sony’s safe harbor for good-faith 
actors, the Supreme Court crafted a new creature of copyright law—inducement liability—to ensure 
that bad guys didn’t get the benefit of the safe harbor protection.7 And what tools did the Court give 
lower courts to distinguish between the righteous and the scoundrel? Given its name, one might 
expect that inducement liability would turn on the affirmative acts taken by one party to persuade 
                                                
5 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
6 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913. 
7 The Court split on the question of how substantial a product’s non-infringing uses had to be to trigger the Sony safe harbor. 
Compare id. at 948 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (concluding that the Sony safe harbor does not apply to products that “were, and had 
been for some time, overwhelmingly used to infringe, . . . and . . . [where] this infringement was the overwhelming source of 
revenue from the products”), with id. at 952-54 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sony’s reference to products “capable of” 
substantial non-infringing uses, and concluding that the mere prospect of commercially significant non-infringing applications 
should insulate a technology provider from copyright liability). But the Justices all agreed that the Sony safe harbor would continue 
to protect those who distributed technologies with “substantial non-infringing uses” and who did not satisfy the inducement 
standard. See id. at 934, 936-37. 
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someone else to infringe;8 and indeed, the opinion begins with this notion of inducement.9 But the 
Court had something broader in mind. While acts of encouragement would certainly help to establish 
inducement liability, the Court found them non-essential. Instead, the key to inducement was 
whether a defendant intended to help others to infringe; the fact that she never expressly encouraged 
such infringement was irrelevant. Intent, moreover, could be proven through a combination of direct 
and circumstantial evidence, including evidence regarding design choices, despite the Court’s denial 
that design choices alone could justify an inducement claim.10 
¶7 In Grokster itself, there was slim evidence that the defendants had ever actually encouraged 
consumers to use their services to infringe. Both Grokster and Streamcast had, of course, encouraged 
users to adopt their services, but there was little evidence that they had specifically urged those users 
to infringe.11 But the dearth of such evidence did not stand in the way of the plaintiffs’ inducement 
claim, because under the Court’s definition, inducement turned on an unlawful objective rather than 
actual provoking acts.12 The Court, for example, found support for the inducement claim against 
Streamcast in a series of “internal communications and advertising designs aimed at Napster users,” 
even though the memos and advertisements had never reached their intended audience: 
Whether the messages were communicated is not the point on this record. The function of 
the message in the theory of inducement is to prove by a defendant’s own statements that 
his unlawful purpose disqualifies him from claiming protection . . . . Proving that a message 
was sent out, then, is the preeminent but not the exclusive way of showing that active steps 
were taken with the purpose of bringing about infringing acts, and of showing that infringing 
acts took place by using the device distributed.13 
¶8 The other facts that the Court found relevant to inducement liability similarly related to the 
defendant’s intent and commercial motivation, rather than any affirmative acts of provocation. The 
Court highlighted three types of evidence that supported the plaintiff’s claim of unlawful intent: the 
defendants’ decision to target former Napster users;14 the defendants’ choice not to adopt filtering 
technologies;15 and the fact that the defendants had a strong commercial motivation to enable 
infringement.16 None of this evidence involved interactions between the Grokster defendants and 
                                                
8 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (induce: “To lead (a person), by persuasion or some influence or motive 
that acts upon the will, to (†into, †unto) some action, condition, belief, etc.; to lead on, move, influence, prevail upon (any one) to do 
something”) (emphasis in original). 
9 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (“Evidence of ‘active steps . . . taken to encourage direct infringement,’ such as advertising an 
infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, 
and a showing that infringement was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a 
commercial product suitable for some lawful use . . . . ”) (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 
992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)) (other internal citations omitted); see id. at 937 (“The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct . . . . ”). 
10 See id. at 939 n.12 (“Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory 
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.  Such a holding would tread too closely to the Sony safe harbor.”). 
11 The Court did cite some evidence that, in its view, could lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the defendants 
“communicated an inducing message to their software users.”  Id. at 937-38. This evidence, however, consisted primarily of 
defendants’ reaching out to former Napster users to market their software. For example, the Court noted that “[t]hose who 
accepted StreamCast’s OpenNap program were offered software to perform the same services [as Napster], which a fact finder 
could conclude would readily have been understood in the Napster market as the ability to download copyrighted music files.” Id. 
12 See, e.g., id. at 936-37 (“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright … is liable for 
the resulting acts of infringement by third parties”) (emphasis added). 
13 Id. at 938 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has imported this notion of inducement into the patent laws, citing 
Grokster for the proposition that inducement can occur even if the defendant never “successfully communicate[s] a message of 
encouragement to the alleged direct infringer.” Ricoh Co., Inc. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
14 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 938-39 (concluding that "defendants’ efforts to supply services to former Napster users, deprived of a 
mechanism to copy and distribute what were overwhelmingly infringing files, indicate a principal, if not exclusive, intent on the 
part of each to bring about infringement”). 
15 The Court skirted around the relevance of the failure to adopt filters, disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit that such design 
choices were “irrelevant,” but also cautioning (no doubt at the behest of Justice Breyer) that the design choices alone could not 
establish inducement liability. Id. at 938-39, 939 n.12. Instead, the Court found that the refusal to adopt a filtering technology 
“underscore[d] Grokster’s and StreamCast’s intentional facilitation of their users’ infringement.” Id. at 939.  
16 Again, the Court noted that this evidence, alone, would not be enough to prove inducement, but that together with the 
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their users. Nor, interestingly, did they have to do with whether the technology at issue had a 
“substantial non-infringing use.” Instead, most of the evidence of inducement centered on whether 
the defendants had adopted a business model deliberately built around infringement. 
¶9 This is an interesting, and not widely anticipated, follow-up to Sony. A mechanical “substantial 
non-infringing use” test—advocated by most scholars in the lead-up to Grokster17—suggests 
agnosticism about the motivation behind the development and dissemination of infringement-
enabling technology. As long as a technology has a significant non-infringing application, its 
manufacturer should be protected without regard to its intent. But by creating its new species of 
inducement liability, the Court put motivation front and center. It turned the inquiry away from the 
relative proportion of infringing and non-infringing uses, and toward the question of whether the 
defendant’s purpose, technology, and business plan center on enabling others to infringe. If a 
defendant acts with intent to enable infringement, the mere distribution of its technology can satisfy 
the conduct requirement for inducement liability.18 Sony’s safe harbor, in other words, turns from a 
general safe harbor to a conditional one, available only for parties with a legitimate, non-infringing 
raison d’être.19 
¶10 The lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead, making intent and commercial 
motivation core factors in evaluating inducement claims. Parties whose apparent purpose and 
business model focus on enabling infringement have fared poorly in the courts, while those who look 
like good guys have enjoyed broad protection under both Sony and the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act. 
¶11 In Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC,20 for example, the district court found inducement 
liability against LimeWire, which had distributed file-sharing software similar to that at issue in 
Grokster. The court cited Grokster for the definition of inducement, requiring both purposeful 
conduct and intent to facilitate infringement by third parties.21 As in Grokster, the conduct 
requirement could be satisfied by virtually any infringement-facilitating act, including the distribution 
of file-sharing software. With purposeful conduct so easily proven, the defendant’s intent took center 
stage.22 The Arista court found evidence of intent in the defendant’s business plan, its customer base, 
and its “failure to mitigate infringing activities”—i.e., its technology design choices.23 Ultimately, as in 
                                                                                                                                            
other evidence, it supported the conclusion that the defendants had acted with unlawful intent. Id. at 940. 
17 See, e.g., Brief of Professors Edward Lee, Peter Shane, and Peter Swire as Amici Curiae in favor of Respondents, Grokster, 
2005 WL 508111 (filed March 1, 2005); Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Faculty in Support of Respondents, Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. 04-480, 2005 WL 508098 (filed March 1, 2005); Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in 
Support of Respondents, Grokster, 2005 WL 508116 (filed March 1, 2005); Brief of Amici Curiae Sixty Intellectual Property and 
Technology Law Professors and the United States Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery in 
Support of Respondents, Grokster, 2005 WL 508123 (filed March 1, 2005). 
18 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940 n.13 (noting that when a party distributes a tool with the intent that others use it to infringe, 
“the culpable act is not merely the encouragement [of infringement] but also the distribution of the tool intended for infringing 
use”). On remand, the district court found as a matter of law that the defendants had induced infringement, based largely on the 
same evidence of intent and commercial motive discussed by the Supreme Court in its opinion. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 984 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
19 Cf. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937 (noting that courts must be “mindful of the need to keep from entrenching on regular commerce 
or discouraging the development of technologies”) (emphasis added). 
20 Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, __ F. Supp. __, 2011 WL 1742029 (May 2, 2011).  
21 Id. at *15 (“To establish a claim for inducement, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) engaged in purposeful 
conduct that encouraged copyright infringement, with (2) the intent to encourage such infringement.”). 
22 Id. at *16 (“[T]here is overwhelming evidence that LW engaged in purposeful conduct that fostered infringement: LW 
created and distributes LimeWire, which users employ to commit a substantial amount of infringement.”). 
23 See id. at 509 (“[T]he following factors, taken together, establish that LW intended to encourage infringement by distributing 
LimeWire: (1) LW's awareness of substantial infringement by users; (2) LW's efforts to attract infringing users; (3) LW's efforts to 
enable and assist users to commit infringement; (4) LW's dependence on infringing use for the success of its business; and (5) LW's 
failure to mitigate infringing activities.”). See also Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (granting summary judgment on an inducement claim against an internet intermediary based on a high proportion of 
infringing files, employees’ knowledge of infringement, failure to adopt filtering technologies, and commercial benefit from 
infringement); Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1110-11 (“Designing and marketing a device 
whose purpose is to allow unauthorized access to, and thus to infringe on, a copyrighted website is sufficient to trigger 
contributory liability for infringement committed by the device’s immediate users.”); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 96 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 2009 WL 6355911 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting summary judgment for copyright inducement against distributor of 
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Grokster, Lime Group lost its case because the court believed that it had built its business around 
third parties’ infringement—the post-Grokster definition of a bad guy.24 Bad guys, it turns out, do not 
get protection under either Sony or the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbors,25 regardless 
of whether their technologies may have potential non-infringing uses. 
¶12 In contrast to this strict treatment of apparently bad actors, the courts have given generous safe-
harbor protection to parties perceived to have a legitimate business model that happens to enable 
third-party infringement. This generosity, moreover, extends to some defendants who know, beyond 
doubt, that their technologies are enabling widespread infringement and yet take few proactive steps 
to prevent it. In Viacom v. YouTube,26 for example, a set of copyright holders sued YouTube for the 
unauthorized posting of their movies on the YouTube website.  YouTube defended under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, claiming that its practice of taking down infringing content upon notice 
complied with the DMCA’s safe harbor requirements.  The court agreed, finding no “red flag” 
knowledge that would rob YouTube of its safe harbor protection.27 The court distinguished 
YouTube from Grokster based on the essential legitimacy of the YouTube service: 
The Grokster model does not comport with that of a service provider who furnishes a 
platform on which its users post and access all sorts of materials as they wish, while the 
provider is unaware of its content, but identifies an agent to receive complaints of 
infringement, and removes identified material when he learns it infringes.28 
¶13 In Perfect 10 v. Visa,29 the Ninth Circuit similarly refused to impose liability against a group of 
banks and others who processed credit card payments for copyright-infringing websites.  Despite a 
scathing dissent from Judge Kozinski, who viewed the credit card companies as complicit profiteers 
who could easily curb online infringement,30 the majority rejected plaintiffs’ claims. The court was 
clearly influenced by the essential legitimacy of the defendants’ core business and the absence of 
specific intent to enable infringement.31 
                                                                                                                                            
bittorrent file-sharing software). 
24 See also Arista Records, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 150-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting summary judgment against a defendant for 
copyright inducement, based on evidence including the proportion of infringing versus non-infringing uses of its service, as well as 
its failure to adopt filtering technologies); cf. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“The 
Supreme Court has recognized that a court may impute culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of an 
accused product.”). 
25 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2011). The DMCA safe harbors protect online service providers from copyright liability for infringement 
hosted through their services, as long as they take down infringing content upon notification and fulfull other requirements of the 
statute.  Courts have held the DMCA safe harbors inapplicable to defendants who have intentionally induced third-party 
infringement.  See Columbia Pictures, 96 USPQ 2d at *18 (Dec. 21, 2009) (holding that “inducement liability and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act safe harbors are inherently contradictory”). 
26 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
27 Id. at 514 (“To let knowledge of a generalized practice of infringement in the industry, or of a proclivity of users to post 
infringing materials, impose responsibility on service providers to discover which of their users’ postings would infringe a 
copyright would contravene the structure and operation of the DMCA.”). 
28 Id. at 526. 
29 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
30 Id. at 816 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (contending that liability should exist when “[d]efendants know about the 
infringements; they profit from them; they are intimately and causally involved in a vast number of infringing transactions that 
could not be consummated if they refused to process … payments; they have ready means to stop the infringements”). 
31 Id. at 802 (refusing to find inducement liability absent a “clear expression” of a specific intent to foster infringement”); id. at 
801 (“Perfect 10 does not allege that Defendants created or promote their payment systems as a means to break laws.”).   The 
court also emphasized the importance of credit cards to the United States economy:   
We evaluate Perfect 10’s claims with an awareness that credit cards serve as the primary engine of electronic 
commerce and that Congress has determined it to be the ‘policy of the United States—(1) to promote the 
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media 
[and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation. 
 
Id. at 794; see also Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (in rejecting claim against video hosting 
service, noting that “the decision rendered here is confined to the specific facts in this case and is not intended to push the bounds 
of the safe harbor so wide that less than scrupulous service providers may claim its protection”) (emphasis added). 
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¶14 Deeming someone a good-faith actor does not necessarily dictate complete immunity from 
copyright liability; even good guys have an obligation to respond to specific notifications of 
infringement by removing or disabling access to infringing content available through their network.32  
But if they do so—if they respond, reactively, to notifications of infringement—copyright law 
protects them from liability.  Inducers, in contrast, face liability without regard to specific knowledge 
of particular infringing acts. 
¶15 Grokster, then, dramatically shifted the focus of analysis for providers of services and 
technologies with both infringing and non-infringing uses. After Grokster, those whose purpose and 
business model center on enabling infringement are likely to face liability on an inducement theory, 
even if their technologies have a substantial non-infringing use. On the other hand, parties who have 
a “legitimate” core business model, but whose service or technology has some infringement-enabling 
potential, will likely receive safe harbor protection under either Sony or the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.33 The name of the game has shifted from quantifying non-infringing uses to satisfying 
the court that the defendant is a good citizen whose services may sometimes be abused by third 
parties. In a sense, the transition from Sony to Grokster reflects a rejection of the idea that the 
technology-protective rule in Sony should insulate parties who acted with illicit motive and effect, or 
who built their business on infringement.34 
B. Trademark 
¶16 While the trademark story has unfolded somewhat differently, it reveals a similar dichotomy 
between the treatment of good guys and bad. Just as in the copyright context, recent trademark 
decisions have shown great solicitude toward good-faith actors, while reserving the option to 
condemn those who act with the apparent design to sow confusion. 
¶17 The trend began with the Second Circuit’s opinion in Rescuecom v. Google.35 In Rescuecom, the court 
had to decide whether to adopt a “trademark use” requirement, which would have barred direct 
trademark infringement claims against parties who did not use the plaintiff’s mark to market their 
own products. Under a trademark use doctrine, intermediaries and others who did not themselves 
engage in trademark use could face liability under trademark law, but under standards of contributory 
rather than direct infringement.36 Rescuecom involved the practice of keyword advertising, in which a 
search engine (in that case, Google) sells advertising space that is triggered by users’ searches for 
particular trademark holders’ products. A search for “IPHONE,” for example, might turn up ads for 
iPhone-compatible applications and accessories, as well as advertisements for competing products. 
Google argued that its practice of allowing keyword-based advertising could not itself constitute 
direct infringement because it did not offer products or services under protected marks; at best, its 
liability was derivative of that of its advertisers.37 The Second Circuit disagreed, finding no basis in 
the Lanham Act for a requirement of trademark use.38 
¶18 The court’s rationale for rejecting the trademark use doctrine had little to do with an analysis of 
the doctrinal differences between direct and contributory infringement, and everything to do with a 
                                                
32 See, e.g., Amazon, 487 F.3d at 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that 
infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to 
Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”). This affirmative obligation does not, it seems, apply to credit card 
companies, because of their lack of direct involvement in delivering infringing content.  See Visa, 494 F.3d at 799-800.  But see id. at 
812 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“Location services and payment services are equally central to infringement . . . .”). 
33 See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
34 See generally Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 184, 192 (2006) (contending that 
“inducement gives courts a new tool for holding culpable defendants liable while reducing the risk of undesirable side effects”). 
35 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
36 See generally Stacey L. Dogan, Beyond Trademark Use, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 135 (2010); Stacey L. Dogan & 
Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669 (2007). 
37 In the interests of full disclosure, I should mention that Eric Goldman and I, on behalf of a group of law professor amici, 
filed a brief in support of Google in the Second Circuit appeal.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Faculty in 
Support of Affirmance, Rescuecom, 562 F.3d 123 (No. 06-4881-CV), 2007 WL 6475455. 
38 Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 132. 
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fear that the trademark use requirement would let unscrupulous defendants off on a technicality. The 
court said so explicitly: “If we were to adopt Google and its amici’s argument, the operators of search 
engines would be free to use trademarks in ways designed to deceive and cause consumer confusion.”39 
¶19 I have argued elsewhere that the court’s fear of immunity for intentional wrongdoers was 
misguided;40 but whether warranted or not, the Rescuecom opinion clearly reflects that fear. And while 
the opinion admits to some ambiguity, Rescuecom’s curious branch of direct trademark infringement 
seems designed to distinguish between the innocent intermediary and the one whose technology and 
business model deliberately seek to confuse. In refusing to dismiss the direct infringement claims 
against Google, for example, the court noted Rescuecom’s allegations that Google’s ad placement 
itself was confusing to consumers, without regard to the content of any particular ad: 
What Rescuecom alleges is that by the manner of Google’s display of sponsored links of 
competing brands in response to a search for Rescuecom’s brand name (which fails 
adequately to identify the sponsored link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant search 
result), Google creates a likelihood of consumer confusion as to trademarks.41 
¶20 The Rescuecom court, in other words, recognized the possibility of a direct infringement claim 
against Google, but suggested that it could not arise merely from an advertiser’s misuse of the 
keyword-advertising tool. Direct liability required Google itself to engage in consumer 
manipulation.42 At least implicitly, then, Rescuecom maintained the distinction between contributory 
and direct trademark infringement for claims based on confusion created by third parties; in such 
cases, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant either “intentionally induces another to infringe a 
trademark,” or “continues to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has reason to know is 
engaging in trademark infringement.”43 Good-faith intermediaries who respond to notifications of 
infringement receive broad protection under this standard. 
¶21 Despite the differences in doctrinal and factual contexts, the Rescuecom opinion has much in 
common with Grokster in policy and effect. Like Grokster, Rescuecom rejected a doctrine that advocates 
had portrayed as critical to protecting legitimate technology developers from liability for third parties’ 
infringement.44 The rejection, in both cases, was motivated by judicial concerns about shielding 
parties that had infringing objectives. And Rescuecom, like Grokster, reshaped infringement doctrine in 
an attempt to target those bad actors.45 At the same time, both decisions arguably retained robust 
protection for technology providers whose intent, commercial motivations, and design choices 
reflect a legitimate, non-infringing purpose.46 
¶22 To the extent that Rescuecom left any doubt about the status of such benign intermediaries, the 
Second Circuit laid it to rest in Tiffany v. eBay.47 Tiffany involved claims of direct and contributory 
infringement against eBay, based on the sale of counterfeit Tiffany merchandise at its auction site. 
The court resolved all of the trademark claims in eBay’s favor, through legal rules that may appear, 
                                                
39 Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
40 See Dogan, supra note 36, at 137-41 (pointing out that such intermediaries could face liability as contributory infringers or 
through an action for unfair trade practices or false advertising). 
41 562 F.3d at 131. 
42 I discuss this reading of Rescuecom more fully in Dogan, supra note 36, at 152-53. 
43 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
44 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1345, 1349 (2004) (“The key policy point is that going after makers of technology for the uses to which their technologies may be 
put threatens to stifle innovation.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1693 (“To treat [online] intermediaries as strictly liable for 
every infringing use of their service . . . would not only transform trademark doctrine but would also impose exactly the type of 
drag on lawful commerce that the direct/indirect infringement dichotomy seeks to avoid.”). 
45 Grokster did this through its intent-based definition of inducement, and Rescuecom through a broadened notion of what 
“uses” of trademarks could constitute direct infringement. 
46 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005) (“[M]ere knowledge of infringing 
potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. . . . The inducement rule, 
instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate 
commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful purpose.”) (emphasis added). 
47 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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on their face, remarkably favorable to defendants.48 A careful reading, however, reveals that such 
solicitude is almost certainly limited to defendants like eBay, who the court was persuaded had 
ultimately non-infringing motives and intent. 
¶23 Tiffany’s direct infringement claim focused on eBay’s use of the TIFFANY marks in eBay’s own 
advertising. The court held that eBay’s own uses of the TIFFANY mark in advertisements and on its 
website were protected, nominative uses promoting genuine Tiffany articles resold in eBay auctions.49 
eBay, in other words, had a legitimate reason to use the TIFFANY mark; unlike the allegations in 
Rescuecom,50 there was no suggestion that eBay’s system design or presentation went beyond that 
lawful purpose.51 eBay’s use of the TIFFANY mark, moreover, was critical to achieving trademark 
law’s pro-competitive objectives. As the court recognized, a robust resale market depends critically 
upon the ability to use trademarks to describe the original source of the resold product.52 
¶24 The court could have stopped there, having established the lawful nature of eBay’s use of the 
TIFFANY mark. It went further, however, taking pains to emphasize facts suggesting eBay’s good 
faith. eBay, for example, allowed Tiffany to maintain an “About Me” page that declared as 
counterfeit “most of the purported ‘TIFFANY & CO.’ silver jewelry” available on the eBay site.53 
eBay also “promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as counterfeit and took affirmative 
steps to identify and remove illegitimate Tiffany goods.”54 Neither of these facts was relevant to the 
legal standard for direct infringement that the court had just announced. But they went a long way 
toward establishing eBay’s credentials as a good guy, worthy of protection under that standard. 
¶25 Turning to contributory infringement, the court rejected Tiffany’s suggestion that any 
intermediary with general knowledge of infringement on its network could face liability for failing to 
block it: “[f]or contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider must have more 
than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. 
Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future 
is necessary.” 55 If eBay had received such specific knowledge and continued to provide its service to 
the counterfeit seller, it could face liability under this standard.  But as long as it responded promptly 
to notifications from Tiffany, its general knowledge of even ubiquitous counterfeit auctions could 
not make it a contributory infringer.56 Because eBay had consistently removed counterfeit listings 
when notified of them, Tiffany could not satisfy this standard. 
¶26 On its face, Tiffany provides extremely broad protection to intermediaries in suits alleging direct 
and contributory infringement. They can use marks in their advertising as long as the ads accurately 
portray some product or service related to their network. And they can protect themselves from 
contributory liability by responding, reactively, to notifications of infringement. As David Bernstein 
has argued, both of these standards would appear to immunize even defendants who had the 
                                                
48 See id. at 103-10.  
49 See id. at 103 (finding no direct infringement when “eBay used the mark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany goods 
offered for sale on its website”).  The court resisted the terminology of “nominative fair use,” opting instead to invoke the general 
principle that trademark law does not prevent truthful, non-deceptive uses of marks by resellers.  Id. at 102-103.   
50 The allegations in Rescuecom, of course, were nothing more than allegations; the court made clear that it was accepting them 
for purposes of Google’s motion to dismiss, but would insist on actual evidence if the case moved forward to trial.  See Rescuecom 
Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Whether Google’s actual practice is in fact benign or confusing is not for 
us to judge at this time.”). 
51 See 600 F.3d at 103 (“[N]one of eBay’s uses of the mark suggested that Tiffany affiliated itself with eBay or endorsed the 
sale of its products through eBay’s website.”).  There was, however, a plausible argument that the content of eBay’s advertisements 
was “misleading insofar as they implied the genuineness of Tiffany goods on eBay’s site.”  Id. at 114. The court, for this reason, 
refused to dismiss Tiffany’s false advertising claim against eBay.  Id. 
52 Id. at 103 (“To impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness of all of the purported Tiffany products 
offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of genuine Tiffany goods.”). 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 107.   
56 Id. at 106-07. 
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commercial motive and intent to enable infringement through their services, or who took no steps to 
root out wrongdoing by their users.57 
¶27 Yet this reading of Tiffany overlooks other hints in the opinion that eBay’s broad protection 
depended critically on its status as a legitimate business concern acting in good faith. The court 
described in great detail, for example, the anti-counterfeiting measures that eBay had adopted over 
the past decade.58 It also emphasized eBay’s own economic interest in reducing counterfeit sales at its 
site.59 And it suggested that if eBay had not acted so responsibly—if it had, for example, willfully 
blinded itself to knowledge of specific counterfeit listings—it could face liability as a contributory 
infringer.60 
¶28 Indeed, the considerations that led the court to reject Tiffany’s claim against eBay largely mirror 
the considerations that led the Supreme Court to side with the plaintiffs in Grokster. Whereas eBay’s 
business plan and commercial motivation aimed to reduce counterfeit sales as much as possible, 
Grokster and Streamcast had an incentive to maximize the volume of infringing transactions using 
their software. Whereas eBay designed its auction network and anti-counterfeit measures to root out 
fake goods, Grokster and Streamcast opted against any filtering measures. And whereas eBay’s 
actions revealed a good-faith intent to abide by the law, Grokster and Streamcast showed a 
commitment to recruit known infringers to their networks. 
¶29 Despite their different outcomes, then, Tiffany in many ways converges with the intermediary 
liability opinions in Grokster and Rescuecom.  In all three cases, intent, design choices, and commercial 
motivation largely determined whether the defendant was viewed as a good or bad actor. And that 
determination, as a practical matter, dictated the outcome of each case—not by absolving good guys 
of responsibility to combat infringement, but by defining that responsibility narrowly. Good guys 
need not redesign their systems or proactively root out infringement that those systems enable; they 
need only respond to specific instances of infringement that they know about and can stop. They 
face liability under copyright or trademark law only if they fail to act in the face of such actual 
knowledge. Bad guys, in contrast, are liable without regard to actual knowledge; having designed their 
product or service to accomplish unlawful ends, they are charged with the natural consequences of its 
use. In both copyright and trademark law, then, good guys get the benefits of rigorous liability 
standards and broad safe harbors; bad guys find themselves in trouble. 
¶30 Intermediary trademark decisions since Tiffany reinforce the good-guy, bad-guy dichotomy.  In 
Rosetta Stone v. Google, 61 for example, the court granted summary judgment for Google in a lawsuit 
involving keyword-based advertising. Rosetta Stone, like Tiffany, concerned the sale of counterfeit 
goods; Rosetta Stone alleged that Google’s keyword ad scheme was being used to direct traffic to 
websites selling counterfeit products. In rejecting both direct and indirect infringement claims against 
Google, the court repeatedly invoked a central theme: that Google has neither the economic 
incentive nor the subjective intent to promote confusion among users of its search engine. As an 
essentially legitimate, non-infringing business, Google escaped liability, even though its services were 
undeniably enabling infringement.62 
¶31 In contrast to Rosetta Stone, other recent decisions upheld trademark claims against intermediaries 
that had the apparent motive and intent to promote third-party infringement. In Gucci v. 
                                                
57 See David Bernstein, Why the Reasonable Anticipation Standard is the Reasonable Way to Assess Contributory Trademark Liability in the 
Online Marketplace, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming July 2011).  
58 600 F.3d at 98-100. 
59 E.g., id. at 98 (noting district court’s finding that eBay had “an interest in eliminating counterfeit Tiffany merchandise from 
eBay . . . to preserve the reputation of its website as a safe place to do business”). 
60 Id. at 109-10 (“[I]f eBay had reason to suspect that counterfeit Tiffany goods were being sold through its website, and 
intentionally shielded itself from discovering the offending listings or the identity of the sellers behind them, eBay might very well 
have been charged with knowledge of those sales” for contributory infringement purposes).  
61 See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
62 Id. at 548 (rejecting contributory infringement claim against Google, when Google responded to notices of infringement 
and “[i]t would run counter to good business practice for Google to encourage and provide advertising space to those it knows are 
infringing”). 
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Frontline,63the famous luxury-goods manufacturer sued a set of financial intermediaries that arranged 
and implemented credit card processing services for sellers of counterfeit goods. In refusing to 
dismiss Gucci’s claims, the court pointed to evidence that one of the defendants had specifically 
sought to induce infringement; the others, while less deliberate in their acts promoting infringement, 
had turned a blind eye to counterfeit sales after receiving specific information about particular 
merchants selling counterfeit merchandise.64 With both sets of defendants, motive played a central 
role in the court’s analysis.65 
¶32 Like copyright law, then, trademark law offers doctrinal tools to reach parties whose financial 
incentives and purpose appear centered on helping others to infringe. At the same time, trademark 
law, like copyright law, reflects a general presumption against meddling in the affairs of legitimate 
businesses. This leads to my final point—that the recent law of intermediary liability is more an 
extension of Sony than a departure from it, and fully comports with the balance struck by the 
Supreme Court in that case. 
II. It All Comes Back to Sony 
¶33 So what does all of this have to do with Sony? One might argue that the story I’ve told reflects a 
rejection rather than an endorsement of Sony. After all, Grokster severely limited the reach of Sony’s 
safe harbor to a whole cast of characters that had thought themselves protected because of their 
services’ substantial non-infringing uses.66 If Sony really meant that courts should take a hands-off 
approach to anyone whose product or service has non-infringing applications, recent history suggests 
an abandonment of the Sony doctrine. 
¶34 When one looks beyond the celebrated “rule” of Sony and considers its underlying purpose, 
however, the recent intermediary liability cases match up surprisingly well with the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in that case. According to the Sony Court, the staple article of commerce rule was intended to 
protect the interests of intellectual property owners while “preserving the rights of others freely to 
engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”67 Sony, in other words, counsels against meddling—
against allowing intellectual property holders to use their rights to interfere with legitimate trade. But 
it was never intended to shield parties whose core business model and actions are specifically 
designed to enable infringement to occur. While imposing liability against these defendants may well 
retard the development of some technologies that have non-infringing applications, neither 
economics nor common sense dictates that the law blindly subordinate copyright interests to the goal 
of technological progress, without regard to the overall costs and benefits of the technology.68 
¶35 If recent history is any guide, moreover, the introduction of fault-based intermediary liability may 
help to preserve the vigor of defendant-protective doctrines in both copyright and trademark law. As 
Professor Yen points out, advocates of a robust Sony safe harbor can take comfort in the fact that, 
with inducement as an outlet, courts need not distort the traditional doctrines of contributory and 
vicarious liability in ways that might lead to broader liability against legitimate actors.69 The existence 
                                                
63 Gucci Am., Inc., v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
64 Id. at 248-53. 
65 See id. at 248-49 (pointing to evidence that one of the defendants had reached out to “high-risk” merchants, “including 
those who sell ‘replica products,’” as a central part of its business); id. at 250 (noting evidence of card processors’ knowledge of 
counterfeit sales); id. at 239-40 (explaining that card processors charged higher rates to merchants of “replica”—i.e., counterfeit—
products); see also Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Price, 2010 WL 5019260 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2010) (refusing to dismiss claim 
against web hosting service that was allegedly intimately involved in setting up websites that sold counterfeit golf clubs). 
66 E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the Grokster and 
Streamcast file-sharing software capable of substantial non-infringing use). 
67 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (emphasis added). 
68 See Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR?  The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 
939, 954-57 (2001) (“courts should not uncritically accept claims of . . . conflict” between copyright incentives and technological 
progress; “to the contrary, they must scrutinize them, in order to ensure that incentives are compromised only when necessary to 
accommodate a valid competing goal”). 
69 Yen, supra note 34, at 238 (“Grokster effectively eliminated the need for expansive interpretations of copyright liability by 
Stacey L. Dogan: “We Know It When We See It”:  
Intermediary Trademark Liability and the Internet 
 
 
Copyright © 2011 Stanford Technology Law Review.  All Rights Reserved. 
11 
of inducement (and, to a lesser extent, Rescuecom’s odd version of direct trademark infringement) can 
similarly preserve the integrity of trademark law by enabling courts to punish bad actors while giving 
broad protection to legitimate businesses acting in good faith. 
III.  Conclusion 
¶36 One of the big challenges in framing rules of liability for intermediaries is determining what 
kinds of behavior we want to incentivize in our society. In Napster, the battle centered on whether 
courts should take a hands-off approach to technology, based on its potential for non-infringing 
use.70 Lurking below the surface, however, was a troubling moral notion that it just didn’t seem right 
to let Napster off the hook despite the potential for non-infringing uses, when its developers had 
clearly built their system with the intent and the design to infringe. This instinct seems to have 
informed the Court’s decision in Grokster: the non-infringing potential of a product or service should 
not immunize a party who deliberately builds its business upon infringement. While Sony offers 
protection to technology developers, that protection looks more like a useless technicality when it 
insulates parties from liability for infringement that they not only made possible, but clearly wanted 
to happen. 
¶37 The same combination of moral judgments has influenced the development of intermediary 
trademark rules on the Internet. Courts find intermediaries liable under trademark law only 
reluctantly, in large part because of worries that broad liability would hamper their legitimate non-
infringing functions.71 This recalcitrance, however, falls away in the face of deliberate acts intended to 
sow confusion, or to help others to do so.  In light of Sony’s anti-meddling principle, this strikes me 
as exactly the right result. 
                                                                                                                                            
endorsing inducement, a cause of action that achieves the goals of expansive contributory liability with far fewer undesirable side 
effects.”). 
70 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (2001); see generally Dogan, supra note 68. 
71 See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (“To impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee 
the genuineness of all of the purported Tiffany products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of genuine 
Tiffany goods.”). In fact, courts frequently invoke the adage that intermediary trademark liability should require a more demanding 
showing than intermediary copyright liability, no doubt because of the more conditional nature of trademark rights.  See, e.g., Sony, 
464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (1984) (distinguishing trademark law’s “narrow” rule of intermediary liability and finding it inapplicable in the 
copyright context); Bangkok Broadcasting & T.V. Co., Ltd. v. IPTV Corp., 742 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Fonovisa 
and Sony); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (E.D. Ca. 1994). 
